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THE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF STATEMENTS "MADE IN THE
PRESENCE OF THE DEFENDANT"
MALCOLM GAYNOR
A common belief among criminal lawyers is
that a statement, although hearsay, is never-
theless admissible in evidence if it is made in
the presence of the defendant.' There is no
support in the cases for that belief. The pres-
ence of the defendant is not sufficient to render
admissible a statement which would otherwise
be hearsay; such presence adds nothing to the
trustworthiness of the statement. 2 Neverthe-
less, testimony concerning statements made in
the presence of the defendant may be admissible
if the statement evokes a reaction by the de-
fendant which constitutes an acknowledgement
of guilt.3 Thus, testimony that the defendant
failed to deny statements made in his presence,
which I e would naturally deny if they were
I This maxim is probably the result either of a
careless reading of the cases, or *of reliance upon
statements made in legal digests and encyclopedias
without reading the cases cited as authority. See,
e.g., 20 Ame. JUR., Evidence § 555 (1939), in which it
is said: "An objection that a statement is hearsay
is not available as to a statement made in the
presence of the party against whom the statement
is offered in evidence and in a conversation in which
he took part."
- 2 Di Carlo v. United States, 6"F.2d 364 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 268 U.S. 706 (1925); State v. Temple,
240 N.C. 738, 83 S.E.2d 792 (1954); 4 WiGmoE,
I:VmENCE § 1071 (3d ed. 1940); Morgan, Admis-
shns, 12 WASH: L. REv. 181, 188 (1937).
3 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 507, comment
b (1942).
untrue,4 is admissible, providing that the
defendant had both the opportunity and the
motive to deny the statements.5
In accordance with the foregoing theory,
W may testify that he saw and heard A accuse
the defendant of a crime, and furthermore that
the defendant failed to deny A's accusation.
If the accusation and the circumstances ac-
companying it were such as to call for a denial
if the statement were false, the court will
admit W's testimony to the fact that the de-
4 This principle is applied to civil as well as
criminal cases. Iii civil cases the failure to deny any
statement that contains an assertion of fact, which
if untrue, a party would naturally deny, is admis-
sible. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pearson, 194 F.2d
284 (2d Cir. 1952); Dill v. Widman, 413 111. 448,
109 N.E.2d 765 (1952); McGulpin v. Bessmer,
241 Iowa 1119, 43 N.W.2d 121 (1950). In criminal
cases, on the other hand, the statement must
generally be an accusation of guilt. See, e.g., Albano
v. State, 89 So.2d 342 (Fla. 1956).
5 Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364 (2d Cir..
cert. denied, 268 U.S. 706 (1925); People v. Bennett,
3 lll.2d 357, 121 N.E.2d 595 (1954); People v.
Hanley, 317 Ill. 39, 147 N.E. 400 (1925); Common-
wealth v. O'Brien, 179 Mass. 533, 60 N.E. 213
(1901); Commonwealth v. Funa, 146 Mass. 570,
16 N.E.*458 (1888); Commonwealth v. Harvey, 67
Mass. (1 Gray) 487 (1854); Commonwealth v.
Kenney, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 235 (1847); Vail v.
Strong, 10 Vt. 457 (1838); McComascx, EvmqcE:
§ 247 (1954); 4 WiGMoRE, EVDENcE § 1071 (3d ed.
1940).
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fendant failed to deny A's accusation. Clearly,
some accusations are more incriminating than
others, and consequently have a greater tend-
ency to require a denial. For this reason, the
jury must know the exact wording of the
accusatory statement in order to ascertain
the need for a denial by the defendant. There-
fore, the court must admit A's accusation as
well as the defendant's failure to deny. Never-
theless, the jury is to consider the accusation
only for the purpose of giving meaning to the
defendant's failure to deny. The accusation
itself is not to be considered for the truth of
the matter asserted.6
Since an accusatory statement is not ad-
mitted for the truth of its contents, the accusa-
tion is technically not within the scope of the
rule against hearsay.7 In addition, because
the truth of the accusation has no bearing
upon the defendant's reaction, evidence con-
cerning the credibility of the accuser is in-
admissible.8 And, since a person's occupation
6People v. Davis, 43 Cal.2d 661, 276 P.2d 801
(1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 905 (1955); People v.
Baker, 119 Cal. App.2d 426, 259 P.2d 737 (1953);
People v. Homer, 8 Ill.2d 268, 133 N.E.2d 284
(1956); People v. Nitti, 312 Ill. 73, 143 N.E. 448
(1924).
7 Hearsay is defined as "testimony in court ... of
a statement made out of court, such statement
being offered as an assertion to show the truth tof
the matters asserted therein, and thus resting upon
the credibility of the out-of-court asserter."
McCoRICK, EVIDENCE § 225 (1954); 5 WIwMOvr,
EvIDENCE § 1361 (3d ed. 1940). In addition. thc
principal objection to hearsay evidence, namely,
that the opponent does not have the opportunity
to cross-examine the declarant, does not apply here
because cross-examination of the declarant bears
only upon the truth of the matter azerted. See
5 WicmoRE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940). More-
over, the defendant may testify if he wishes, ahd
explain the reason for his failure to deny the accu-
sation. See Morgan, Admissions as an Exception to
the Hearsay Rule, 30 YALE L. J. 355 (1921).
8 Boston & W.R.R. v. Dana, 67 Mass. Q1 Gray)
83 (1857) in which evidence to discredit the ac-
cuser was excluded because his honesty was pot in
issue; Commonwealth v. Kenney, 53 Mabs. t12
Met.) 235 (1847); State v. Wilson, 205 N.C. 37e,:
171 S.E. 338 (1933), where an infa:.". statert t'
and social status are i.-,portant el."-':
his credibility, such evidence of the accuser's
identity should, as a rule, be excluded.' The
court should only admit the fact that an accu-
sation was made, and the contents of that
accusation.
The statement is sometimes made that
silence of the defendant in the face of an accu-
sation is the factor which renders the evidence
admissible. However, it is the defendant's
failure to deny an accusation made in his pres-
ence, rather than his silence, which is signifi-
cant.10 Therefore, if the defendant expressly
denies the truth of the accusation, the statement
is inadmissible." On the other hand, if the
response to the accusation is an equivocal
answer, the accusation and the answer will be
admitted, provided that the equivocal answer
would tend to raise an implication that the
defendant believed the accusation to be true.1
2
Silence of the defendant in the face of an
was admitted. Bid cf, People v. Jordan, 292 111. 514,
127 N.E. 117 (1920), in which a ife's statement
was excluded. See also, Maguire, Adoptive Admis-
sions in Massachusetts, 14 MASS. L. Q. 62 (May
1929).
9 See text at notes 23-24, infra, for a discussion
of those circumstances in which this evidence
should be admissible.
10 MCCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 247 (1954).
"People v. Yeager, 194 'a. 452, 229 Pac. 40
tJ 924); People v. McCoy, 127 Cal. App. 195, 15
I' 21 543 t1032 ; People v. Nitti, 312 I1. 73, 143
N: L 44-z t1924'; People v. Pfanschmidt. 262 111.
411, 104 N.E. 804 (1914); McGeever v. American
Nat'l Red Cross, 330 Mass. 239, 112 N.E.2d 788
(1953); Commonwealth v. Twombly, 319 Mass.
464, 66 N.E.2d 362 (1946); Commonwealth v.
Ellis, 319 Mass. 627, 67 N.E.2d 234 (1946); Com-
monwealth v. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 180, 31 N.E.
961 (1892); McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 247 (1954);
4 W ImORE, EvIDENCE § 1072(5) (3d ed. 1940).
But cf. Rex v. Christe, [19141 A.C. 545, where a
denial %%ab held to be admissible. Morgan explains
this case away on the theory that an express denial
will be admitted as evidence of a state of mind.
Morgan, Admissions, 12 WAsH. L. RE%. 181, 187
(1937).
12 People v. Popilsky, 361 Ill. 268, 8 N.E.2d 640
'1937) ("Give me a break- held admissible); Com.
uinwealth v. Hebert, 264 ,:i.-. 571, 161 N.E. 189
:I 1.i: I 1have n, rhim. " held .1:i-ible)
[Vol. 48
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accusation is of course admissible since it is
the clearest type of failure to deny.
ELEMENTs OF THE 'PRINC-'
Circumstances ina3 be present under which
even an innocent man would not deny an
accusation. For example, if the circumstances
surrounding the accusation are such that
there is no opportunity or motive for the
defendant to deny, or if the defendant does
not hear the statement, or lacks knowledge of
the facts stated in the accusation, his failure
to deny cannot constitute any evidence of
guilt. Moreover, there is danger that a jury
might well attach considerable weight to such
evidence, even though it has no actual probative
value. For this reason courts have attempted to
define those circumstances in which failure to
deny an accusation will create an implication
of guilt.
Opportunity to Deny-When the defendant
does not have the opportunity to deny an
accusation, both the accusation and the re-
sponse evoked are inadmissible.13 Such lack
of opportunity to answer might arise, for
example, from a physical disablement such as
intoxication 4 or unconsciousness, 15 or from a
Jones v. State. 222 Miss. 387, 76 So. 2d 201 (1954);
State v. McKenzie, 184 Wash. 32. 49 P.2d 1115
(1935); People v. McCoy, 127 Cal. App. 195, 15
P.2d 543 (1932) ("I will talk to the jury" held to
be admissible); McCoRAUcK, EVIDENcE § 247
(1954); Morgan, Admissions, 12 WASH. L. REv.
181, 187 (1837). But cf. People v. Simmonq, 28 Cal.
699, 172 P.2d 18 (1946), where the defendant's
answer that he had nothing more to say was held
to be an assertion of his 5th amendment privilege
and therefore not admissible.
"3 People v. Hanley, 317 Il1. 39, 147 N.E. 400
(1925); Slattery v. People, 76 Ill. 217 (1875);
Commonwealth v. Kenney, 53 Mass. (12 Met.)
235 (1847); 4 WIGUORE, EvmENCE § 1071 (3d ed.
1940).
14 People v. Allen, 300 N.Y. 222, 90 N.E.2d 48
(1949).
15 See People y. Koerner, 154 N.Y. 355, 48 N.E.
730 (1897), where the court went so far as to indi-
cate that the defendant did not have an opportunity
to reply even if he was faking unconsciousness, since
to reply would have given away the ruse.
fear of physical violence. 16 In addition, if the
defendant has been advised by his attorney
not to answer questions, or is in doubt as to
his legal rights, no implication of belief by the
defendant in his guilt will arise from his failure
to deny. 7 Furthermore, in a judicial hearing,
where the defendant is obviously not privileged
to interrupt, a failure to deny accusatory
statements is not admissible.1
Motive to Deny-In addition to an oppor-
tunity to deny the accusation, the defendant
must have a motive to deny.19 For this reason,
the statement must be of a type which would
naturally call for a reply; that is, it must
clearly be an accusation of guilt.'" In addition,
the question of whether the defendant is bound
to reply to an accusation made during a con-
versation between two other parties some-
times arises." It is unreasonable to apply an
16 See Sprouse v. Commonwealth, 132 Ky. 269,
116 S.W. 344 (1909) where the defendant was
threatened by a mob.
17 People v. Hodson, 406 Ill. 328, 94 N:E.2d 166
(1950); People v. Kozlowski, 368 Il. 1-24, 13 N.E.2d
174 (1938); People v. Blumenfeld, 330 Ill. 474, 161
N.E. 857 (1928); People v. Hanley, 317 I1. 39,
147 N.E. 400 (1925).
11 Friedman v. Forest City, 239 Iowa 112, 30
N.W.2d 752 (1948); Commonwealth v. Russo, 177
Pa. Super. 470, 111. A.2d 359 (1955); Jones v. State,
184 Tenn. 128, 196 S.W.2d 491 (1946). Miller v.
Dyess, 137 Tex. 135, 151 S.W.2d 186 (1941).
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 247 n.7 (1954); 4
WIGOOE, EvIDENCE § 1072(4) n.7 (3d ed. 1940).
19 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1072 (3d ed. 1940).
20 People v. Hartwell, 37 Cal. App. 799, 175 Pac.
21 (1918); Brantley v. State, 115 Ga. 229, 41 S.E.
695 (1902); Chapman v. State, 109 Ga. 157, 34
S.E. 369 (1899); Newman v. Commonwealth, 28
Ky. L. Rep. 81, 88 S.W. 1089 (1905); Davis v.
State, 85 Miss. 416, 37 So. 1018 (1904). People v.
Countryman, 201 App. Div. 805, 195 N.Y.Supp.
728 (4th Dep't 1922).
1 Simmons v. State, 115 Ga. 574, 41 S.E. 983
(1902) in which a conversation between two officers
not addressed to the defendant was held not to
call for a reply; hence the failure to reply was in-
admissible. But cf. Rocchia v. United States, 78
F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1935) where an officer's accusa-
tion of defendant, in the defendant's presence,
although addressed to a superior, was held admis-
sible; 4 WiGOORE, EVIDENCE § 1072(3) (3d ed.
1940).
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inflexible rule that a response to a third-party
statement is always inadmissible. The fact
that an accusation was not addressed directly
to the defendant may not be a significant
element in every case. Accordingly, such
statements are generally treated in the same
manner as if they were addressed directly to
the defendant. Courts inquire into the particu-
lar facts of each case in order to determine
whether the circumstances were such as to
call for a reply from the defendant.
22
The identity of the accuser is apparently
not considered a significant factor as to whether
the defendant should have replied to an accu-
sation"3 and yet the factor of his age, position
or mental status may well be important. For
example, if the accuser were an infant, or other
person whose statements would normally be
disregarded, there would be little motive to
deny an accusation. For this reason, the element
of identity should be considered. However, a
jury may well use evidence of the identity of
the accuser for the purpose of adding weight
to the testimony.24 Accordingly, evidence of
- identity of the accuser should only be ad-
.rntted when it tends to rebut the defendant's
motive to deny.
Within the Defendant's Hearing-Before any
implication from the failure to deny a statement
can arise, the defendant must hear the state-
ment.U There is controversy, however, as to
whether it is the responsibility of the prosecu-
tion to show that the statement was heard,
or whether the defendant must establish that
he was unable to hear the accusation. The
majority view is that the prosecution must
offer affirmative proof that the defendant
heard the accusation.26 Wigmore, on the other
22People v. Piburn, 138 Call.App. 56, 31 P.2d
470 (1934); People v. McCoy, 127 Cal.App. 195,
15 P.2d 543 (1932); Kelley v. People, 55 N.Y. 565
(1874).
= A search of the cases has not revealed any
consideration of this problem by the courts.
24See text at note 7.
25 Commonwealth v. Kenney, 53 Mass. (12 Met.)
235 (1847); McCoRMIcK, EvrDENcE § 247 (1954);
4 WlGimoE, Evmx.cE § 1072(2) (3d ed. 1940).
2 See Ruth v. Rhodes, 66 Ariz. 129, 185 P.2d 304
(1947).
hand, favored a more liberal view which would
allow a presumption that the defendant heard
the statement, upon a showing by the prosecu-
tion that the statement was made in the pres-
ence of the defendant. Presence, under this
view, implies that the statement was made
within the range of hearing of the defendant.2
Although it is clear that the prosecution will
have some difficulty in proving that an accu-
sation was heard, the presumption of a de-
fendant's innocence should place the burden
of production of this evidence upon the prose-
cution. The majority view is thus the more
rational, because it eliminates the danger that a
defendant will not be able to offer proof that
he did not hear the accusation.
Knowledge of the Facts--A majority of courts
have held that the defendant must have a
knowledge of the truth of the facts stated in the
accusation before any implication can arise
from a failure to deny it. Thus, under the
majority view, the evidence is inadmissible
unless the prosecution can establish that the
defendant was aware of the incident described
in the accusation.2U Wigmore, on the other hand,
proposed that the evidence should be received
regardless of the defendant's personal knowl-
edge of the facts stated.29 His view is based
upon his classification of this type of evidence
as an admission. The basis of the admissiblity
of an admission is the conflict between what
the party now claims and what he "admitted"
in prior statements. Since the basis of ad-
missibility is the conflict of claims rather than
the personal knowledge of the accused, such
knowledge can, under this view, affect the
weight to be given an admission by a jury,
but cannot affect its admissibility.32 For this
reason, an admission is receivable against a
2 4 WIOUORE, EVIDENCE § 1072(2) (3d ed. 1940).
28 2 Wi GoRE, EvmxNcx §§ 650-86 (3d ed. 1940).
Before a witness can be considered competent to
testify to a fact, the courts usually require that he
be an eye witness to that fact. This requirement is
in essence the rule against hearsay. See note 8
supra. Commonwealth v. Kenney, 53 Mass. (12
Met.) 235 (1847); Reall v. Deiriggi, 127 W.Va. 662,
34 S.E.2d 253 (1945).
" 4 Ws moRE, EviDENCE J 1072(2) (3d ed. 1940).
- 4 id. § 1053.
[VCol. 48
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party regardless of his personal knowledge.
However, a defendant cannot be expected to
deny an accusation when he has no knowledge
of the facts bearing on his guilt. Fo- example,
if he were suffering from a lapse of memory, or
was unconscious at the time of the alleged
commision of the Lrime, his lack of response
to an accusation would have no significance.
For this reason a majority of courts exclude
the evidence when knowledge of the facts has
not been established by the prosecution.
AccusATIONS MADE wmLE THE DEFENDANT
Is UNDER ARREST
Frequently, situations in which the de-
fendant fails to deny an accusation arise while
the defendant is under arrest. There are three
views as to the admissiblity of the defendant's
reaction to statements made while he is in the
custody of the police.
Some jurisdictions follow a strict rule which
excludes all evidence of failure to deny an
accusatory statement after the defendant is
under arrest.3 The rationale of this view is
that frequently even an innocent man will
not speak while under arrest if he knows that
whatever he says may be used against him.
The strict view is also directed at the police
practice of reading long statements to an
accused for the purpose of inducing him to
confess.
2
A second view, known as the "Massachusetts
rule," excludes evidence of the defendant's
silence in the face oi an accusation made while
he is under arrest 3" but permits the use of an
equivocal answer.31 Actually, there is no signifi-
3'Yep v. United States, 83 F.2d 41 (10th Cir.
1936); Rickman v. State, 230 Ind. 262, 103 N.E.2d
207 (1952); McCoRmcK, EvmENcE § 247 n.12
(1954).
n People v. Simmons, 28 Cal.2d 699, 172 P.2d
18 (1946).
"'The rule was first laid down in Common-
wealth v. Kenney, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 235 (1847).
a Commonwealth v. Hamel, 264 Mass. 564, 163
N.E. 168 (1928); Commonwealth v. Madeiros, 255
Mass. 304, 313; 151 N.E. 297 (1926); Common-
wealth v. Spiropoulos, 208 Mass. 71, 94 N.E. 451
(1911). New York at the present time follows the
Massachusetts view but there was conflict in that
cant distinction between silence and an equivo-
cal answer. The admission of equivocal answers,
while excluding evidence of silence, indicates a
lack of confidence in the validity of the ex-
clusion of the defendant's reaction to state-
ments made while he is under arrest.
Under the third and majority view of arrest
cases, the courts inquire into the circum-
stances of each case in order to determine
whether the defendant was, in fact, prevented
from denying the accusation by fear of physical
or mental duress from the police.Y The fact
that the accused is under arrest does not, in
every instance, preclude the defendant from
giving an accurate portrayal of his belief in
his innocence. The majority is the better
reasoned view because it treats arrest as just
another factor bearing upon whether the cir-
cumstances were such as to call for a denial,
rather than as the decisive factor.
ADMISSIBILITY AND BURDEN OP PRoo
The preliminary question of whether the
jury could reasonably find that -the circum-
stances surrounding the accusation were such
as to call for a reply from the defendant is a
jurisdiction for some time. Compare People v.
Rutigliano, 261 N.Y 103, 184 N.E. 689 (1933),
xith People v. Kelley, 55 N.Y. 565 (1874).
15 ks a result of the strict nature of its rule,
.Massachusetts, on one occasion, has been quite
technical as to what constitutes an arrest, and
thereby eased the rule to some extent. Common-
wealth v. Morris, 264 Mass. 314, 162 N.E. 362
t1928) held that a defendant was not under arrest,
although the officer who was with him at the time
of the accusation testified that had the defendant
tried to escape, he would have detained him. This
holding leaves considerable doubt as to whether a
defendant can be sure of the protection of the
Massachusetts rule. This is the natural effect of the
creation of a rule that eliminates evidence by means
of a mechanical test, which is applied inflexibly in
all cases.
-6 United States v. Kelley, 119 F.Supp. 217
(D.C. 1954); People v. Davis, 43 CalApp. 661,
276 P.2d 801 (1954); People v. Bennett, 3 1l.2d
357. 121 N.E.2d 595 (1954); State v. Landeros,
20 N.J. 76, 118 A.2d 524 (1955); 4 WiGxoaE,
EVIDENCE § 1072(4) (3d ed. 1940); McCoRmcx,
I.DENCE § 247 n.13 (1954).
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question for the judge.37 Thereafter the ques-
tion of whether the circumstances were, in
fact, such that an innocent man could and
would deny the accusation is for the jury.5
In practice, the prosecution has the burden of
establishing the existence of conditions which
call for a denial of the accusation.n Wigmore,
on the other hand, proposed that all accusatory
statements made in the presence and hearing
of the defendant be admissible unless the
defendant can show that he could not rea-
sonably, be expected to deny the statement. 40
Under this view the defendant would have
the burden of showing the absence of con-
ditions raising an implication of his assent to
the statement. This view is predicated upon
the argument that the defendant can testify
himself, and thereby show the judge that he did
not have the opportunity or motive to deny.
The effect of this reasoning is to create an
unjustified presumption that conditions sur-
rounding the accusation called-for a denial.
In view of the fact that this evidence is highly
prejudicial, courts should continue to require
that the prosecution make a convincing showing
of conditions calling for a denial before ad-
mitting this type of evidence.
1EOR.EICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR
ADInIssIBIrY o FAILURE TO
DENY
Although it is generally agreed that the type
of evidence under consideration is admissible,
7 People v. Simmons, 28 Cal.2d 699, 172 P.2d
18 (1946); Johnson v. Underwood, 102 Ore. 680,
203 Pac. 879 (1922); McCarthy v. Bishop, 102
S.W.2d 126 (Mo. App. 1937).
8 There are cases which apparently hold that
the jury is to consider the evidence, in the first
instance, without a preliminary finding by the
judge as to whether the circumstances are sufficient
to raise an implication of his belief in his guilt.
However, upon closer analysis of those cases, it is
clear that the issue at which they are really directed
is whether the question of the conditions surround-
ing the accusation should be considered at all by
the jury. See McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 247 nn.17
& 18 (1954).
3 See, e.g., Ruth v. Rhodes, 66 Ariz. 129, 185
P.2d 304 (1947).
404 WiGuoRz, EVIDENCE § 1071 at 74 (3d ed.
1940).
there are two theories upon which it is ad-
mitted. Each theory labels the evidence differ-
ently. Wigmore termed this evidence an
"adoptive admission," and justified its ad-
mission on the theory that the silence of the
defendant in the face of an accusation is the
equivalent of assent.4 The comments to the
Model Code of Evidence, on the other hand,
classify this evidence as "conduct evidence,"
and justify its admission on the theory that,
from the defendant's conduct in failing to deny
an accusation, one might reasonably conclude
that he believed the accusation to be true.
4 2
Where the defendant is silent in the face of an
accusation, the difference in the theory of
admissibility is one of form rather than sub-
stance; evidence of the defendant's silence is
admissible under both theories. However, it is
difficult to classify an evasive response as the
equivalent of assent. For this reason, the
application of Wigmore's theory would pre-
clude the admission of evidence of an equivocal
answer to an accusation. Nevertheless. equivo-
cal answers have generally been held ad-
missible. 43 The theory of the Model Code
allows the admission of an equivocal ans er as
conduct which indicates that the defendant
believed the accusation to be true. For this
reason, the Model Code's theory is a better
explanation of how the courts actually treat
this evidence.
44
414 id § 1071.
2 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 507, comment
b (1942).
43 See note 12 supra.
4Morgan, Admissions, 12 WASH. L. REv. 181,
187 (1937). Wigmore classified a different type of
evidence as "conduct evidence," and justified its
admission on the theory that some inference could
be drawn from the conduct of the defendant that
he believed himself to be guilty. 4 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1052(b) (3d ed. 1940). However, he
did not include the evidence with which we are
concerned within that classification. 2 id § 292. As
examples of "conduct evidence" Wigmore cited
demeanor when charged with a crime, when ar-
rested, or during a trial; refusal to undergo a super-
stitious test; and flight, escape, resistance, or con-
cealment from justice. 2 id §§ 273-6.
[Vol. 48;
